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SOLID WASTE REGULATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
RUTH L. KOVNAT*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a line that describes the boundary between Indian Country'
and state lands. On the Indian side of the line, land ownership is
complicated: some land is held in trust by the United States for the
.benefit of the tribe, some land is held by tribal members subject to a
trust, some land is held in fee by tribal members, and the rest of the
land is held in fee by non-members. 2 Assume that a national waste
treatment company seeks to use the land on the Indian side of the
boundary as a solid waste or hazardous waste site. To sharpen this image
and the jurisdictional conflict that such a use will inevitably cause, imagine
that the site proposed for the facility is up-gradient of non-Indian land

so that any contamination emanating from the site will pollute nonIndian resources. Or think of the situation in reverse: the siting of a
facility on non-Indian land, up-gradient of Indian land, which threatens

Indian resources. In either case, two sovereignties, Indian tribe and state,
have substantial interests in regulating the facility. The extent of their
power to do so, however, is uncertain under current law.
During the last decade, an increasing number of federal courts have
decided questions about the source and extent of inherent sovereign tribal
power to regulate activities that threaten tribal health and environment.
A related issue, the extent to which the regulatory reach of the state
may*extend into Indian Country to protect non-Indians, is also the subject

* LL.B., Southern Methodist University; Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School
of Law.
1. The term "Indian Country" generally includes more territory than the term "reservation."
It is defined statutorily as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of
the United States government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original
or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits
of a State, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988). See generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW ch. 1 (2nd
ed. 1982) [hereinafter COHEN].

2. Changes in federal Indian policy have resulted in this patchwork of Indian land holding.
During the treaty-making years, 1789-1871, the overriding goal of the United States was to obtain
Indian lands by treaties of cession. Many treaties allowed the United States to allot land to Indians,
frequently with restrictions on alienation. From 1871-1928, federal policy shifted toward allotments
and individualized property. Much of the land allotted to individual Indians passed into non-Indian
hands. The General Allotment Act of 1887 provided that title to allotments be held in trust by the
United States for 25 years. At the end of the trust period, the laws of descent and partition in
the state where land was located applied. Thus, lands allotted to Indians could end up in nonIndian hands after the end of the trust period. See generally COHEN, supra note 1, ch. 2.
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of much litigation. Unfortunately, federal court decisions neither draw
a bright line between areas of exclusive tribal regulatory jurisdiction and
exclusive state power nor adequately explain circumstances that justify
exercises of concurrent power.
Legislation is another complicating factor. Major comprehensive federal

environmental laws enacted between 1970 and 1984 establish a pattern
of federal-state regulatory cooperation that encourages state participation
in both the development and enforcement of environmentally protective
standards as long as states comply with certain federally-mandated criteria.
But, until 1986, Congress nearly completely ignored the tribal role in
protecting the environment. A shift came in 1986 when Congress amended

the Safe Drinking Water Act 3 and included a provision authorizing the

Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to treat tribes as states for
certain regulatory programs governed 5by the Act. 4 Later, similar provisions
6
were added to the Clean Water Act and to the Superfund law.
Congress is expected to reauthorize the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA"). 7 Then, for the first time, the EPA will have

authority to grant Indian tribes the status of states for enforcement of
waste management programs under the RCRA.

3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1988).
4. Id. § 300j-1.
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (1988).
7. Id.§§ 6901-6987.
8. House Bill 3735 is the principal vehicle for RCRA reauthorization. It will amend 42 U.S.C.
section 6903 by adding the following new paragraphs:
(a)(41) The term "Indian Country" means (A) all land within the limits of any
Indian Reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way running through
the reservation, (B) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the
United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof,
and whether within or without the limits of a State, and (C) all Indian allotments,
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running
through the same.
(42) The term 'Indian Tribe' means any Indian tribe, band, group, community,
including any Alaska native village, organization, or regional corporation as defined
in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, recognized
by the Secretary of the Interior and exercising governmental authority within Indian
country.
H.R. 3735, § 904(a), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The amendment adds a new "Sec. 1009. Indian
Tribes." It authorizes:
(a) IN GENERA-Subject to the provisions of subsection (b), the Administrator(1) is authorized to treat Indian tribes as States under this Act,
(2) may delegate to such tribes primary enforcement responsibility for programs
and projects under this Act, and
(3) may provide such tribes grant and contract assistance to carry out functions
provided by this Act.
(b) EPA REotULrTIONS-(I) The Administrator shall, not later than 18 months after
the date of the enactment . . . , promulgate final regulations which specify how
Indian tribes shall be treated as States for purposes of this Act. Such treatment
shall be authorized only if(A) the Indian tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial governmental
duties and powers;
(B) the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to land and resources
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This new authority will add still another wrinkle to the already hopelessly
crumpled fabric of the law of environmental regulatory jurisdiction in
Indian Country because it, like its legislative predecessors, fails to define
tribal authority with sufficient clarity to allow tribal governments confidently to commit resources to environmental protection. To make matters
worse, the new legislative effort will be interpreted against a backdrop
of federal Indian law already flawed by indeterminate definitions of tribal
authority over solid waste management in Indian Country.
This article argues that this indeterminacy itself undermines the fundamental goals of protecting human health and the environment, and,
for that reason, revision of the proposed solid waste legislation is necessary
to resolve federal, state and tribal clashes over regulation of solid waste
facilities sited near the borders of Indian Country. To make that argument,
this article first describes the present status of the law of environmental
regulatory jurisdiction in Indian Country 9 in the particular context of
solid waste regulation; second, it compares the proposed authority in the
RCRA reauthorization amendments with similar authorities in the Clean
Water Act 0 and the Safe Drinking Water Act," focusing on difficulties
that have surfaced in the implementation of those authorities; and finally,
it recommends a revised RCRA tribal authority provision aimed at promoting health and environmental protection without undermining the
sovereign prerogatives of either states or tribes.
II.

CURRENT LAW: SOLID WASTE REGULATORY
JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY

Currently, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"),
the law establishing the regulatory framework for management of solid
wastes, mentions Indian tribes only when defining "municipality."' 1 2 The
effect of this definition is to leave the tribal governmental role indeterminate with respect to enforcement of solid waste programs while si-

which are held by the Indian tribe, held by the United States in trust for the Indian
tribe, held by a member of the Indian tribe if such property interest is subject to
a trust restriction on alienation, or are otherwise within Indian country; and
(C) the Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the Administrator's
judgment, of carrying out the functions to be exercised in a manner consistent with
the terms and purposes of this Act and of all applicable regulations.
H.R. 3735, § 1009, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
9. A rich literature exists on this subject. See, e.g., Allen, Who Should Control Hazardous
Waste on Native American Lands? Looking Beyond Washington Department of Ecology v. EPA,
14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69 (1987); Royster & Fausett, Control of the Reservation Environment: Tribal
Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REV. 581 (1989);
Wilkinson, Cross-JurisdictionalConflicts: An Analysis of Legitimate State Interest on Federal and
Indian Lands, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 145 (1982); Comment, Regulatory Jurisdiction Over
Non-Indian Hazardous Waste in Indian County, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1091 (1987); Comment, The
Developing Test for State Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Application in the Context
of Environmental Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 561 (1982).
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (1988).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-ll (1988).
12. "Municipality" is a term which includes "an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization
or Alaska Native village or organization .. " Id. § 6903(13).
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multaneously subjecting tribes to regulation under the Act. By contrast,
the RCRA contains elaborate provisions allowing states both to administer4
and enforce hazardous waste"3 programs and to develop solid waste plans.
Because the RCRA currently fails to delegate regulatory power to tribal
governments so that they may directly protect their environments from
solid waste hazards, the general law on the sources of federal, state, and
tribal sovereign power becomes relevant not only to understand the present
scope of tribal power, but also as a benchmark to assess any proposed
reallocation of authority.
A.

Federal Regulatory Power
In general, primacy of regulatory power falls on the governmental
entity with territorial jurisdiction. 5 Accordingly, Congress has undoubted
power under the Commerce Clause 6 of the United States Constitution
to delegate regulation of solid waste 7 to a federal agency when the
activity occurs anywhere within the territorial boundaries of the United
States. As long as a statute is intended to apply generally, the rule is
the same for Indian lands. 8 Congress may even abrogate treaty rights
reserved to tribes or to individual Indians so long as there is clear evidence
that Congress actually considered the statute's effect on treaty rights. 9
The dominance of federal authority over .Indian lands is a corollary
of Indian tribal status in the United States, described by Chief Justice
Marshall as "domestic dependent nations." 20 Primacy of federal power
is so well-settled that it may be implied.
For example, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency2' upheld the EPA's power to establish an underground22
injection program on Indian land under the Safe Drinking Water Act
even though, at the time, that Act, like the RCRA, made no mention
of Indian tribes or Indian lands other than to include tribal organizations

13.
14.
15.
of the

Id. § 6926.
Id. §§ 6941-6949(a).
In the context of taxation jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has recently recognized that each
three different governmental entities, the United States, the state, and the tribe, have taxing

jurisdiction over non-Indian oil and gas wells located within the borders of a reservation, as well
as within a state and the borders of the United States. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,
490 U.S. 163 (1989).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
17. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141 (1977) (state restrictions on importation
of solid waste violate the dormant commerce clause).
18. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960) ("[lt is
now well settled .. . that a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and
their property interests."). Congress has an additional source of power over Indian tribes stemming
from the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.3. See United States v. Sioux Nation,
448 U.S. 371 (1980). For an exhaustive treatment of federal power over Indians, see Newton, Federal
Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984).
19. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (clear evidence of congressional intent to abrogate
treaty rights found in. the Eagle Protection Act).
20. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
21. 803 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1986).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1988).
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within the definition of municipalities. In upholding the EPA's direct
authority over reservation land, the Court reasoned that Congress, to
achieve the general purpose of clean drinking water, intended uniform
nationwide application of the Act and that construing the Act to preclude
the EPA from regulating Indian lands would impermissibly contradict
that purpose.2 1 Similarly, a construction of the RCRA ousting EPA
authority over Indian lands would be inconsistent with the national goal
of eliminating threats posed by improper management of solid waste.
Accordingly, the EPA has administratively applied the RCRA to Indian

lands .24
Although these precedents leave little doubt about the dominance of
federal power in the management of solid wastes on Indian lands, they
do not solve the jurisdictional puzzle because, as a practical matter, the
jurisdictional contest over solid wastes is not between tribes and the
EPA, but is between tribes and states. This is so because the RCRA,
like most other major federal environmental laws, authorizes the EPA
to approve state regulatory programs, but fails to expressly authorize
tribal regulation. In short, Congress has exercised its federal power in
legislation that favors decentralized programmatic control for states, yet
leaves the tribal regulatory role open. Thus, while the EPA has empowered
many states to enforce the RCRA, tribal governments may lack similar
authority over tribal lands. If tribes have any power as against states to
regulate solid wastes on their lands, it derives from general federal Indian
law and not from the RCRA. The starting point for analysis of the
question of tribal regulatory power over solid wastes is a series of recent
Supreme Court decisions which identify some of the important factors
governing allocation of state and tribal regulatory power.
B.

Tribal Regulatory Jurisdiction

1. Over Members
2
A tribe's regulatory jurisdiction over its own members is well-established
and virtually unlimited. 26 Although subject to ultimate federal control,
a tribe remains a separate people with the power to regulate its internal
and social relations. 27 As the Supreme Court explained in United States
v. Wheeler,28 Indian sovereignty exists only at the sufferance of Congress,
but until Congress acts the tribes retain those aspects of sovereignty not

23. See also Blue Legs v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 668 F. Supp. 1329 (D.S.D.
1987), aff'd, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989).
24. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 255.33 (1989). Even though the RCRA does not authorize delegation
of regulatory authority to tribes, courts have ruled that Indian tribes are regulated entities under
the RCRA. Blue Legs v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989); Washington
Dept. of Ecology v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
25. See, e.g., Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906).
.26. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
27. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886).
28. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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withdrawn by treaty or statute or by implication as a necessary result
of their dependent status. 29 Thus, courts have upheld tribal power to
determine rules of membership, 0 to regulate domestic3 2relations among
tribal members, 3' and to establish rules of inheritance.
These precedents leave little question that a tribal government's powers

3
include enforcement of solid waste regulations against its own members,

especially if the regulated solid waste activity is located on trust or

allotment land. Unless Congress acts to oust tribal authority over tribal
members, this regulatory power exists as an attribute of inherent tribal
sovereignty. Its scope is broad enough to extend to a tribal solid waste
facility owned by a tribe or its members even when that facility might
pose threats to persons or property outside tribal boundaries. 3 By contrast,
recent case law casts a shadow on the scope of tribal power to regulate

non-members 35 and may sharply limit tribal power to regulate a nonmember solid waste facility, especially one located on fee land within
the boundaries of a reservation.

2.

Over Non-Members

Recent Supreme Court decisions3 6 suggest that the scope of tribal
regulatory jurisdiction over non-members depends upon whether nonmember activities occur on trust or allotment land or whether, instead,
they occur on fee land.3 7 Drawing a distinction between fee and non-fee
lands within the boundaries of Indian reservations, at the threshold, helps
to highlight the two theories that currently compete as the rationale for

judicial recognition of tribal jurisdiction over non-members-persons
who,
38
by definition, have no voice in the governance of the tribe.

29. Id. at 323.
30. Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897).
31. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
32. Roff, 168 U.S. 218.
33. This conclusion is consistent with EPA policy. In 1984, the EPA issued a policy encouraging
both tribal decisionmaking on environmental matters and Indian self-determination. UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA POLICY ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROGRAMS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS

(1984) [hereinafter 1984 EPA POLICY].

The long tradition of tribal sovereignty, coupled with the rule that states are generally precluded
from exercising jurisdiction over Indians in Indian Country, supported the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision upholding the EPA's refusal to permit the State of Washington to apply its
hazardous waste regulations to Indian lands within Washington. Washington Dept. of Ecology v.
United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
34. The state may claim concurrent jurisdiction over a solid waste facility located such that
state natural resources are threatened. For a discussion of the contours of concurrent jurisdiction,
see text accompanying notes 75-88.
35. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of Yakima, 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989).
36. See supra note 35.
37. See supra note 2 for an explanation of the forms of land holdings in Indian Country.
38. Justice Stevens' dissent in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 172 (1982),
explains that tribal authority to enact legislation affecting non-members is appropriately limited
because non-members are excluded from participation in tribal government. This is consistent with
the fundamental principle that each sovereign governs only with the consent of the governed. Id.
at 173.
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The first theory is that of inherent sovereignty. This theory holds that
tribes retain attributes of sovereignty akin to those possessed by other
governmental bodies; that is, power over people and territory. Its espousal
leads not only to recognition of tribal regulatory authority over nonmember trust or allotment land activities, but also justifies exercises of
tribal power over non-Indian-owned fee land within the territorial boundaries of a reservation. 39 Tribal retention of broad governmental powers
stemming from inherent sovereignty underpins the Supreme Court's recognition of exclusive tribal power to regulate non-member hunting and
fishing in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe4 and to regulate non41
member gambling in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.
The notion of inherent sovereignty is equally important in taxation
cases. In holding that Arizona taxes imposed on non-Indian activities
performed solely on a reservation are preempted, the Supreme Court
42
relied on tribal retention of sovereignty over both members and territory.
The Court rooted tribal power to impose severance taxes on non-member
oil and gas leases on trust lands in inherent tribal power to control
economic activity within its territory. 43 Similarly, tribal power to tax
cigarette sales to non-members on trust land stems from inherent sovereignty. 44
By contrast, the competing theoretical framework for tribal power over
non-members insists that self-governance is the only attribute of tribal
sovereignty to have survived the formation of the United States; hence,
there is no general tribal governmental authority over territory. At the
extreme, this theory precludes extension of sovereignty-based tribal power
to non-members even when they engage in activities on trust or allotment
land. Adherents to this theory do not currently go this far; however,
they do find that the sole source of tribal regulatory power over nonmembers rests on treaty provisions which allow tribes to exclude nonmembers from acting anywhere within the boundaries of a reservation
or from territory reserved for the tribe. This treaty-based regulatory
power is not an attribute of general sovereignty. Rather, the power to
regulate is merely an implied incident of the power to exclude: a power
45
to impose conditions on the entry or continued presence of non-members.
Cases involving non-member activities on fee land show that application
of the principle that tribal regulatory power over non-members is nothing
more than an incident of the tribe's right to exclude non-members serves
to narrow the scope of tribal regulatory jurisdiction over non-members.

39. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Brendale, 109 S. Ct. at 3019, asserts that judicial precedents
establish that "tribal authority is not implicitly divested except in those limited circumstances
principally involving external powers of sovereignty where the exercise of tribal authority is necessarily
inconsistent with their dependent status." Id. (emphasis added).
40. 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
41. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
42. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
43. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
44. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
45. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima, 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989).
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For example, Montana v. United States16 addressed the scope of tribal
power to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on fee land owned by
non-Indians within the boundaries of the reservation. The majority of
the Court assumed that tribal power to exclude non-Indians from its
land supports tribal regulation of non-member hunting and fishing on
trust land or on land belonging to the tribe or its members. 7
As to fee land, however, the Court found that Congress obliterated
tribal power to exclude others from land alienated to non-Indians under
the Allotment Acts.4 8 Thus, the fundamental question before the Court
became whether general tribal governmental powers support extension of
the tribe's authority over all lands within the boundaries of the reservation
so as to encompass all non-member activities. Concluding that inherent
powers of a tribe do not extend to relations between the tribe and nonmembers, the Court barred the operation of tribal law to fee land within
the reservation. 49 The Court distinguished earlier decisions upholding tribal
regulation of non-members" ° on the grounds that those cases involved
non-member activity occurring on Indian land and not non-member activity occurring on non-Indian-owned fee land, thus implying that the
exclusionary theory fully explained the outcome of those cases. 5
For its part, Montana recognized only two exceptions to the general
principle that limits inherent tribal powers to tribal self-governance. First,
a tribe has power to regulate non-members if they engage in consensual
activities with the tribe.5 2 The Court did not elaborate upon the kind of
consensual activity that might satisfy this exception. In particular, it failed
to explain why non-member hunting and fishing anywhere within the
boundaries of a reservation does not amount to consent to regulation
by tribal authorities.
The second Montana exception recognizes that a tribe may regulate
non-members if their activities pose a direct threat to the economic,
health, and safety interests of the tribe or its members.5 3 Again, the
Court did not specify the sorts of tribal interests that might justify tribal
regulation of non-member activities on fee land within the boundaries
of the reservation. 4 However, the Court's bare recognition of the existence

46. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
47. Id. at 557.
48. Id. at 559-60 n.9.
49. Id. at 563-65.
50. E.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
51. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.
52. Id. The Court explained the result in Colville on this basis, in part. Apparently, it saw the
decisions of non-members to purchase cigarettes from tribal enterprises as consent to the imposition
of tribal taxes. Id.
53. Id. at 566.
54. Compare Montana, 450 U.S. 544 with New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S.
324 (1983). In Mescalero, the question was the extent of the state's power to regulate non-member
hunting and fishing within the boundaries of the reservation where the tribe owned all but 193.85
acres of 460,000 acres. Id. at 325-26. The state did not dispute tribal power to regulate hunting
and fishing of its members. However, it did claim concurrent power over non-Indians seeking to
hunt and fish within the reservation. Id. at 330. Montana was distinguished on the basis that it
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of these economic, health, and safety interests suggests implicit acceptance
that tribal governmental powers stem from inherent sovereignty and are
not merely an attribute of exclusionary powers.
At least one federal district courts' has so interpreted the second
Montana exception, applying it to support tribal regulation of nonmember-owned fee land when a tribal ordinance imposed a moratorium
on industrial development within the reservation. A non-Indian owner
of fee land within the reservation applied to the county for a permit to
construct an asphalt and cement plant on its land. The county approved
the permit, and the tribe sought a preliminary injunction to halt the
project. The court issued the preliminary injunction, allowed tribal regulation of non-member fee land on the basis of the second Montana
exception, and found that the tribal interests in protecting air and water
quality and preventing harmful noise pollution were the kinds of health
and safety interests which Montana recognized
as justification for tribal
56
governance of non-members on fee land.
Under this analysis, solid waste facilities that threaten tribal resources,
although sited on fee land and owned by non-members, will likewise be
subject to tribal regulation. However, whether anything remains of the
Montana exception that tacitly recognizes inherent tribal authority over
non-members depends upon an interpretation of the Supreme Court's
most recent, sharply divided opinion on the issue of the source and scope
of tribal power over non-Indian activities on fee land within reservation
7
boundaries, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima.1
Brendale is a case which pitted tribal authority against state authority
in the context of zoning. By a Treaty of 1859, the Yakima Nation ceded
58
land to the United States, retaining a reservation of 1.3 million acres.
Thereafter, some acreage was alienated, and at the time of the litigation,
eighty percent of the land was held in trust for the tribe, while the
remaining twenty percent was held in fee by Indian or non-Indian owners.

involved fee land and in any event was not controlling on the question of stite power to regulate
hunting and fishing within the reservation. Id. at 330-31. In a unanimous opinion, Mescalero held
that New Mexico law seeking to regulate non-member hunting and fishing on the reservation was
preempted because the tribal interest in managing wildlife, coupled with the federal interest in
promoting tribal self-government, outweighed the state interests. Id. at 343-44. The result was to
recognize exclusive tribal regulation over even the small part of the reservation that was not owned
by the tribe.
55. Governing Council of Pinoleville Indian Comm'n v. Mendocino County, 684 F. Supp. 1042
(N.D. Cal. 1988).
56. Id. at 1044-45.
57. 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989). As subsequent discussion will make clear, the various opinions in
Brendale reveal the contours of the debate. The plurality opinion affirms the principle that inherent
tribal powers extend only to tribal members and discredits the notion that the tribal governance
extends to non-member activities on tribal land, as distinguished from non-member fee land, except
as an incident of the power to exclude. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. The dissenters
argue to the contrary, claiming that the general principle underlying tribal authority is that the tribe
retains power over non-Indians on reservation lands, even as to fee lands, unless exercise of sovereignty
is inconsistent with overriding interests of the national government. They deny that the source of
tribal power over non-Indians is an incident of the power to exclude non-Indians from the reservation.
See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
58. Brendale, 109 S. Ct. at 3000.
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Most of the fee land was located in three towns which were generally
open to non-Indians. The rest of the fee land was scattered throughout
the reservation. 9
In 1970, the tribe adopted its first zoning ordinance, applying it to
all lands within the boundaries of the reservation, including non-Indianowned fee landA0 The County of Yakima also had a zoning ordinance
which purported to apply to all real property within the county, excluding
only Indian trust lands. The case involved two tracts of land, each owned
by a non-Indian seeking to develop his land. One tract was in town and
the other tract was in a more remote part of the reservation. 6' Because
the tribal zoning ordinance limited development which the county ordinance permitted, the Yakima Nation challenged the proposed development and the county's exercise of zoning authority. Its complaint
sought a declaration that the tribe had exclusive authority to zone all
of the property at issue. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
tribe's exclusive zoning power, rooting tribal zoning authority in the right
to fulfill general governmental powers, including coordinated, comprehensive zoning.
The principle of inherent tribal regulatory power over non-members
adopted by the court of appeals was endorsed by only the dissenting
Supreme Court justices. 62 While no other theory explaining the source
and scope of tribal authority captured a majority, the Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals' conclusion about the tract located in the
remote part of the reservation, but reversed as to the tract located in
town.
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Kennedy, authored an opinion for a plurality of the Court that
relied heavily on Montana. First, the plurality reiterated that tribes have
no power to exclude non-Indians from lands alienated under the Allotment
Acts, holding that the effect of those Acts was to eliminate tribal authority
to exclude non-Indians. 63 Accordingly, the plurality reasoned that tribes
cannot rest regulatory power over fee lands on a lesser included exclusionary power.
As for inherent sovereignty as a source of tribal power to regulate fee
lands, the plurality reaffirmed the general principle of Montana, holding
flatly that Indian regulatory jurisdiction does not extend to fee land
unless: (1) non-member activities occur through consensual arrangements;
or (2) the activity threatens or directly affects the political integrity,
economic security, or health and welfare of the tribe.64
Moreover, the plurality explained that a tribe bears a heavy burden
to qualify for this limited, inherently sovereign tribal authority over non59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Justice Stevens characterized the towns as the "open part" of the reservation and the other
parts as the "closed part" of the reservation. Justice White's plurality opinion rejected this classification, finding it not to be true in fact and to have no legal significance. Id. at 3000 n:2.
62. Id. at 3017.
63. Id. at 3004.
64. Id. at 3006.
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members. To justify extension of its jurisdiction over non-Indian-owned
fee lands, a tribe must show that the non-member activity has a demonstrably serious impact that imperils the economic security or health
and welfare of the tribe.6 5 Applying these principles, the plurality would
have reversed the court of appeals as to the land in town because the
tribe could not possibly make the requisite showing as to that land.
However, as for the land on the more remote part of the reservation,
the plurality would have remanded for a determination of the tribal
interests in applying their zoning ordinance to land surrounded by undeveloped tribal land.
Justice Stevens, who was joined by Justice O'Connor, authored the
dispositive opinion. He rejected the notion that tribes retain any inherent
sovereign power over non-members,66 thus adhering to the view that the
sole source of tribal power over non-members stems from tribal power
to exclude non-members from reservation land. While Justice Stevens
agreed with the plurality that the tribe lacked power to extend its zoning
ordinance to the non-Indian-owned fee land located in town, he analyzed
the problem entirely in terms of tribal power to exclude. Because, as a
practical matter, the tribe relinquished its power to exclude non-members
from the towns by allowing non-members free access to the towns, he
concluded that the tribe likewise lost its power to impose zoning restrictions
on non-member owned land in the towns even though the land was
within reservation boundaries. 67
As for the land on the more remote part of the reservation, Justices
Stevens and O'Connor concluded that the tribe retained its power of
exclusion by actually denying access to non-Indians. This entitled the
tribe to exercise the lesser included power of imposing conditions on
non-members. 68 Just how much Justices Stevens and O'Connor depart
from the plurality about the theoretical basis of tribal authority to regulate
zoning becomes clear in their discussion of the remote areas. Whereas
the plurality would have remanded for evidence of tribal interests in
zoning that area, Justices Stevens and O'Connor explained that however
important evidence of tribal interests might be to support tribal regulatory
power under an inherent sovereignty theory, it is logically irrelevant if
the tribal power rests solely on a tribe's power to exclude non-Indians.
Only evidence of manifestations of exclusionary intent counts for that
authority. Having found such evidence with respect to the remote areas,
Justices Stevens and O'Connor joined with the three dissenting Justices

65. Id. at 3008.
66. Id. at 3009.
67. Id. at 3017.
68. Id. at 3015. Justice White disputed the facts. He saw little evidence that the tribe had
actually closed the remote areas of the reservation to non-Indians. Moreover, he did not take it
to be legally significant because he found that any exclusionary power formerly retained by the
tribe was erased by alienation of land to non-Indians under the Allotment Acts. Once land is
alienated to non-Indians, the tribe, by definition, loses its power to exclude non-Indians from that
land. Id.
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to uphold exclusive tribal power to zone fee lands located within the
reservation outside of the towns6
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented.
He would have upheld exclusive tribal power to zone both tracts at issue.
He reasoned that the Court's precedents compel the conclusion that tribes
retain sovereign power over both their people and their territory. Territorybased sovereign powers extend to non-Indians who are on reservation
land 70 and are qualified only by the principle of federal supremacy, which
holds that tribal sovereign power may fall to inconsistent, overriding

federal interests .71

Thus, the dissenters disagreed with Justice Stevens and wholly rejected
the concept that the sole source of tribal power over non-Indians is an
incident of the power to exclude non-Indians from reservations. They
also rejected the limitations on inherent tribal authority that the plurality
found to be compelled by Montana. Instead, the dissenters concluded
that Montana was itself an aberration from the generally accepted sovereign theory that presumes tribal regulatory power over all persons and
territory within the boundaries of the reservation, a presumption that
can be displaced only by a showing of contrary and overriding federal
interest. 72 Even so, the dissent explained that tribal zoning power satisfies
even the plurality's stringent qualification test for the second Montana
exception because the power to control land use is very important to
tribal economic and political interests. 73
The sharp, theoretical divisions expressed in Brendale reveal a state of
flux in general federal Indian law of regulatory jurisdiction. This state
of flux clouds predictions about allocations of state and tribal regulatory
power over solid waste. Nevertheless, some forecasting is possible regarding the issues raised by the hypothetical scenarios described at the
beginning of this article. For example, if a non-member national waste
management enterprise seeks to site a facility on trust or tribally owned
land, tribal regulatory jurisdiction rests firmly on a double base. First,
all members of the Supreme Court appear to agree that the tribal right
to exclude non-members from land reserved to the tribe encompasses the
power to regulate activities taking place there. Moreover, even those
Justices who repudiate general inherent tribal sovereignty over non-members may find consensual activity of the sort which justifies tribal authority
even over fee lands in an arrangement between a tribe and a national
solid waste company that sites a facility on non-fee lands within a
reservation's boundaries.
The non-member national solid waste management enterprise's selection
of a site on non-Indian-owned fee lands presents a more difficult question,
however. After Brendale, the existence of tribal jurisdiction appears to

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 3018.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3023.
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turn on multiple factors. To satisfy proponents of the exclusionary theory
of regulation, crucial evidence will focus on the location of the fee land,
the location of the proposed site in relation to the rest of the tribal or
trust lands, the characteristics of the surrounding tribal holdings, and
the conduct of the tribe in permitting access to the region by nonmembers. 74 For those who accept limited tribal regulatory authority over
non-members under the second Montana exception, the central inquiry
will be the degree to which lack of tribal authority over the facility
imperils tribal interests in protecting the health and safety of members
and interferes with tribal natural resources and economic development.
To forecast which view will gain ascendancy is perilous. If, however,
a majority of the Court solidifies around the Brendale plurality's analysis
under the second Montana exception, which implicitly entails the weighing
and balancing of tribal interests against the regulatory interests of the
state, some judicial guidelines exist. Before Brendale, an inquiry of this
kind was familiar in preemption cases, which primarily analyzed the scope
of states' power to regulate non-member activity within the boundaries
of a reservation together with the related question of concurrent state
and tribal regulatory jurisdiction. 7 To help arrive at a more complete
assessment of the impact of Brendale on the distribution of solid waste
regulatory power between tribe and state, then, it is useful to look at
earlier doctrines governing concurrent tribal/state jurisdiction.
Concurrent State/Tribal Jurisdiction
Return to the solid waste facility owned and operated by a non-member
and located within the reservation but near its boundaries. If the facility
is mismanaged, persons and property off of the reservation may be
threatened. For this reason, a state may wish to assert police power
authority over the facility even though it is located on the reservation.
The state will claim that its authority extends to all non-members within
the territorial limits of the state and that exercise of this authority is
necessary to protect state health and safety interests. The success of this
claim depends on whether state interests outweigh tribal and federal
interests, an inquiry, according to the United States Supreme Court, that
sovereignty and the
proceeds in light of traditional notions of tribal
76
congressional goal of Indian self-government.
77
In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, New Mexico claimed
power to regulate hunting and fishing of non-Indians on reservation
lands. The Court held that state regulation of hunting and fishing by
anyone on the reservation was preempted, explaining that state jurisdiction
C.

74. Presumably, Justice white is correct when he says in Brendale that the tribe may not prevent
access to a non-member to land which he owns by virtue of alienation under the Allotment Acts.
Id. at 3003-04.
75. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987); New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
76. California, 480 U.S. at 216.
77. 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
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is preempted if it interferes with or is incompatible with federal and
tribal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the
assertion of state authority. 78 The Court found a federal interest in a
number of congressional statutes intended to promote tribal self-government and a tribal interest both in the large capital investment in the
development of a resort facility intended to attract non-Indian customers
and in the importance to the tribe of maintaining comprehensive management of wildlife on the reservation. 79 The Court rejected concurrent
regulatory authority because application of state law undermined the
integrity of the tribe's management program.
The Court also upheld tribal law against a state assertion of regulatory
authority in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,80 which
held that California's law governing gambling was incompatible with
federal and tribal interests. In that case, the Court found federal interests
in a number of statutes providing federal financial assistance for construction of bingo facilities, as well as in Secretary of Interior guidelines
governing review of bingo management contracts.8 ' The most important
tribal interest was the economic development fueled by the revenue available from bingo, which was especially critical to a tribe that lacked other
2
resources.
Weighing and balancing of tribal and federal interests against state
interests does not, however, always result in preemption of state regulation.
Where the state interests are strong and when state regulation may be
accomplished without undermining a tribal regulatory scheme, the Court
has upheld state regulation. In Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes 3 and in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville,84 the
Court found state interests in assuring the collection of taxes on sales
of cigarettes to non-members to be sufficiently weighty to justify the
imposition of tax-collecting recordkeeping burdens on tribal smokeshop
operators. Concurrent regulation was permissible because the state recordkeeping requirements related only to non-member sales and were
supplemental to any tribal recordkeeping requirements; thus, it did not
interfere with any competing tribal regulatory scheme. 85
Limited tribal sovereignty was also acknowledged in Mescalero and
Cabazon, even though both of those decisions confirmed tribal sovereignty
over state assertions of authority within the reservation. In Cabazon, the

78. Id. at 333.
79. Id. at 341.
80. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
81. Id. at 218.
82. Id. at 218-19.
83. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
84. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
85. Id. at 160-61. In addition, the Court has upheld state regulation against tribal sovereign
claims on other grounds. For example, in Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983), the Court based
California's power to require a tribal member and federally licensed Indiana trader operating a
general store on a reservation to obtain a state license to sell liquor for off-reservation consumption
on the historical grounds that Congress had never intended tribal sovereignty to encompass regulation
of liquor traffic. Id. at 733-34.
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tribes argued that "state laws [are] generally .

.

. [i]napplicable to tribal

Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly

provided that state laws shall apply." '8 6 The Court refused to apply a
rigid per se rule precluding state regulatory jurisdiction over tribes and

tribal members.8 7 In addition, in Mescalero, the Court recognized that
under certain circumstances a state may assert jurisdiction over even the
on-reservation activities of tribal members.18

D. Application of Current Doctrine to Solid Waste Regulation
As the foregoing discussion of precedent shows, current doctrine offers
little principled guidance for resolving tribal and state jurisdictional clashes
over those solid waste facilities that threaten off-reservation resources.
The preemption cases suggest only that concurrent jurisdiction is theoretically possible when state and tribal regulatory schemes dovetail such
9
that one scheme does not undermine the other. However, it is nearly
impossible to conceive of such compatible state and tribal solid waste
regulatory regimes.

As for competing tribal and state claims to exclusive jurisdiction, current
law appears to weaken tribal regulatory powers over non-members' activities on fee land. If a non-Indian solid waste facility is located on fee
land, application of Brendale's plurality principle favors state regulation

unless the tribe can show that tribal interests substantially outweigh state

interests, an impossible showing if the proposed facility threatens offreservation health and safety. Thus, placing the burden on the tribe to
make this showing, as the Brendale plurality does, guarantees the failure
of tribal regulatory jurisdiction even if the health and safety of tribal
members is also threatened by the facility. Application of Justice Stevens'
exclusionary theory only reinforces this outcome if the tribe is unable

86. 480 U.S. at 214 (quoting United States Dept. of the Interior, Fed. Law 845 (1958) (emphasis
added)). The tribe relied on McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). The
dissent in Cabazon forecasts an additional doctrinal ground for limiting tribal sovereign power.
Authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices O'Connor and Scalia, the dissent, relying heavily
on Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), argues
that commercial transactions between Indians and non-Indians are not shielded from state regulation
by a blanket immunity. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 225. In Colville, the Court rejected the tribe's twofold contention: first, that their involvement in cigarette marketing on the reservation necessarily
ousts the state from power to exact state taxes on sales to non-members; and second, that the state
lacks power to impose administrative burdens associated with the collection of state taxes on a
tribal enterprise. Id. (quoting Colville, 447 U.S. at 154).

87. The Court explained that in the special area of taxation, the Court has adopted a per se
rule invalidating state taxes of Indian tribes and individual Indians because the federal tradition of
Indian immunity from state taxation is very strong and the state interest in taxation is correspondingly
weak. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215 n.17. Cf. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163
(1989) (the Court upheld state power to impose severance taxes on non-Indian held oil and gas

leases on Indian lands).

88. 462 U.S. at 331-332.
89. States and tribes may enter cooperative agreements that will coordinate state and tribal

regulatory schemes. These agreements are encouraged by EPA Indian policy. See 1984 EPA POLICY,
supra note 33.
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to show that it denied general access to land surrounding the fee land. 9°
Only when a non-member solid waste facility with off-reservation effects
is located on tribal land is it likely that tribal interests will outweigh
state interests, even if the risks to health and safety interests off-reservation
are as great or greater than those on-reservation. This forecast is based
upon consistent judicial recognition of the importance of a tribal interest

in its economic development. Use of tribal land for solid waste disposal
is an increasingly more valuable land use because of the scarcity and

high cost of landfills in densely populated regions. Thus, making tribal
land available for solid waste disposal may serve tribal economic interests.
These economic interests, coupled with a tribe's interest in protecting the
health and safety of its members and in protecting the quality of tribal
soil, air, and groundwater, may very well outweigh a state's interest in
protecting the health and safety of its citizens.
III.

THE IMPACT OF THE RCRA

Part II of this article explains how current doctrines of federal Indian
law might allocate jurisdictional authority over solid waste facilities located
in Indian Country. This part of the article analyzes the impact of the
RCRA on federal Indian law doctrine in two ways: first, by examining

application of legislation now in force to show how the EPA has im-

plemented the RCRA in Indian Country; and second, by forecasting the
impact of proposed RCRA amendments that treat tribes as states 91 by
drawing on comparisons between the RCRA proposal and the implementation of similar provisions under the Safe Drinking Water and the
Clean Water Acts.

90. It is unclear whether location on fee land surrounded by "closed" land would tip the balance
in favor of tribal regulation even for adherents of the exclusionary theory. Research has uncovered
only one post-Brendale appellate decision, Baker Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 17
Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 5033 (N.D. 1990). In this case, a tribal council
designated a non-member utility as the exclusive supplier of power to a tribal industries building
located on tribal land that was surrounded by land that was primarily open to non-Indians. The
utility challenged the assertion of regulatory authority by the state Public Service Commission by
means of a writ of prohibition. On the motion of a competing utility, without the participation
of the tribe as a party, the state supreme court quashed the writ and remanded to the Public
Service Commission for a determination of its jurisdiction in the matter. Id. The court upheld the
Commission's decision that its jurisdiction over utilities encompassed those utilities supplying power
to a building within the reservation boundaries on the ground that the utility had no standing to
assert tribal sovereignty as a shield against state regulation. Id. at 5039. While the court's Brendale
analysis is merely dicta, it is interesting that the North Dakota Supreme Court purported to apply
the Brendale plurality view even though the tribal building was located on tribal land. It stated
that the general rule is that tribes lack inherent sovereignty over non-members, such as utilities.
Id. at 5036. It noted, moreover, that the tribe had previously acquiesced in state utility regulation.
Id. at 5037.
The opinion's Brendale analysis seems flawed. The true ground of the opinion, apart from the
standing issue, is that the utility is subject to state regulation because of its location within the
geographical boundaries of the state. That it sells its power outside of those boundaries does not
divest the state of jurisdiction.
91. See supra note 8.
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The RCRA's Application to Indian Country
Despite the absence of express provisions governing Indian Country in
the RCRA, the EPA promulgated regulations to implement the RCRA93
in Indian Country. 92 Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs
considered the applicability of the RCRA's solid waste regulations to
Indian lands and the relationship of the RCRA to traditional tribal
sovereign immunity from suit. 94 Blue Legs involved a tribal member's
95
complaint, under the citizens' suit provision of the RCRA, that the
Oglala Sioux Tribe, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Indian Health
96
Service violated the RCRA by maintaining garbage dumps on tribal
land or on land held by individual members in trust for the tribe, in
violation of EPA regulations. The court held that the tribe, together with
the federal defendants, must clean up the dump sites. The Court rejected
the argument that tribal immunity shields a tribe from RCRA suits in
federal court, holding instead that Congress abrogated tribal sovereign97
immunity when it allowed citizens to bring suit against "persons,"
defined to include "municipalities, 98 which in turn include Indian tribes.
The Court also refused to require the plaintiff to exhaust tribal court
remedies, reasoning that the RCRA's grant of exclusive jurisdiction to
federal district courts" expressly limits the usual presumption, grounded
°
in Congress' general preference for tribal self-government,'1 that tribal
courts have initial jurisdiction. Blue Legs held plainly that tribes are
regulated entities under the RCRA and are thus subject to EPA regulations
and to citizens' suits. By parity of reasoning, one must also conclude

A.

92. See, e.g., 40 CFR § 255.33 (1989).
93. 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989).
94. See Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthod Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877 (1986).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988). The RCRA's citizens' suit provision allows, among other things,
any person to commence a civil action against any person alleged to be in violation of any permit,
condition, standard regulation, prohibition, requirement, or order that has become effective under
the Act, or against any person who is contributing or has contributed to the handling, treatment,
storage, transportation, or disposal of any hazardous or solid waste which may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. Id.
96. The RCRA prohibits open dumping.
Upon promulgation of criteria under section 6907(a)(3) of this title, any solid waste
management practice or disposal of solid waste or hazardous waste which constitutes
the open dumping of solid waste or hazardous waste is prohibited, except in the
case of any practice or disposal of solid waste under a timetable or schedule for
compliance established under this section.
Id. § 6945(a).
97. Id. § 6903(15). "The term 'person' means an individual, trust, firm, joint stock company,
corporation (including a government corporation), partnership, association, State, municipality,
commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." Id.
98. Id. § 6903(13). "The term 'municipality' (A) means a city, town, borough, county, parish,
district, or other public body created by or pursuant to State law, with responsibility for the planning
or administration of solid waste management, or an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization
or Alaska Native Village or organization...." Id.
99. Id. § 6972(2). "The district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce the permit, standard, regulation, condition,
" Id.
requirement, prohibition or order ..
100. See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
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that by subjecting "persons" to the full range of hazardous waste federal
enforcement options, 0'° Congress also intended to abrogate tribal immunity
with respect to administrative orders assessing civil penalties, 0 2 civil suits
initiated by the federal government,' 03 and criminal prosecutions,' 04 thus
exposing tribes to the full range of federal enforcement powers under
the RCRA.
Ironically, Blue Legs points in two directions simultaneously, as revealed
by rulings of the district court on remand. 0 5 Even as the decision weakens
tribal governments by reaffirming federal supremacy over the .Oglala
Sioux and subjecting the tribe to RCRA enforcement, it confirms that
the tribe plays a dominant role in the management of solid wastes. The
latter point was clarified when the federal defendants in Blue Legs
remained recalcitrant about carrying out their shared cleanup responsibilities despite the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision imposing
that burden on them. The federal defendants, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and the Indian Health Service, argued that because Congress had
allocated no funds for the purpose of upgrading dumps on the reservation,
the money must come from funds earmarked for water supply and sewer
systems for individual Indian homes.1 06 In dismissing the federal defendants' position as "cavalier, willful, and contumacious. . . ,"107 the district
court ordered the defendants to submit and implement a cleanup plan
and to share the costs of implementation, with the Bureau of Indian
Affairs bearing 50% of the cost and the tribe and the Indian Health
Service each bearing 2500 of the cost.108 Most interestingly, the court
emphasized that the tribe, not the Indian Health Service or the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, has management responsibility for reservation solid
waste, responsibility which is broad enough to encompass the power to
draft and implement rules for site operation and to ensure annual funding
for site operation in compliance with the RCRA by setting waste disposal
rates.' °9 Thus, even though the RCRA fails to grant express authority
to tribes to manage solid wastes, this court found such tribal power to
be implicit in the RCRA scheme, at least as to dumps on tribal land.
Washington Department of Ecology v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency" o also construed the RCRA both to confirm primacy
of federal power in management of hazardous waste in Indian Country
and to recognize tribal power over tribal lands, yet equivocated about
the scope of tribal power over non-Indians. The State of Washington
submitted to the EPA an application for interim authorization to carry

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988).
Id. § 6928(a)(1).
Id.
Id. § 6928(d).
Blue Legs v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 732 F. Supp. 81 (D.S.D. 1990).
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id. at 84.
Id.
752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
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out a hazardous waste program that governed all lands within its geographical boundaries, including Indian lands."' The EPA approved Washington's application except insofar as it purported to apply to Indian
lands, grounding its decision on Washington's failure to adequately dem12
The Ninth Circuit Court of
onstrate its jurisdiction over those lands.
Washington to regulate
authorize
to
refusal
EPA's
Appeals affirmed the
that the RCRA
ground
narrow
the
on
lands
hazardous waste on Indian
lands.
Indian
on
Indians
regulate
to
does not authorize states
the impact of
address
to
refused
expressly
Circuit
Ninth
However, the
The
Country."'
Indian
in
non-Indians
over
power
the RCRA on states'
EPAwhich
to
extent
the
about
silence
RCRA's
the
that
court concluded
approved state programs are to operate in Indian lands left undisturbed
the well-settled principle of federal Indian law that generally precludes
4
states from exercising jurisdiction over Indians in Indian Country." The
court held that this principle, taken together with the long tradition of
tribal sovereignty, justified the EPA's refusal to allow Washington to
apply its hazardous waste program to Indian lands within the geographical
boundaries of Washington.'
Although Washington Department of Ecology did not settle whether
the RCRA's state authorization scheme disturbs the backdrop of federal
Indian law with respect to state regulation of non-Indian activities on
Indian lands," 6 its reasoning compels the conclusion that the RCRA leaves
intact general Indian law governing that subject. Certainly, Congress is
as resoundingly silent about allocations of state and tribal regulatory
jurisdiction over non-Indian activity as it is about Indian activity on
Indian lands." '7
Brendale shows how difficult it is to ascertain exactly how general
federal Indian law allocates regulatory jurisdiction. If Brendale allows
state jurisdiction over non-member activity on fee land, as it arguably
does so long as the tribe has permitted general access to the area by
non-members, and also on tribal land if state interests outweigh tribal
interests, the net effect of Blue Legs and Washington Department of
Ecology, both of which affirm tribal power under the RCRA, is actually
to disempower tribes from regulating non-member solid waste facilities.
First, Blue Legs construes the RCRA to strip tribes of their traditional

111. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(c)(1) (1988).
Any State which has in existence a hazardous waste program pursuant to State law
before the date ninety days after the promulgation of regulations under ... [this
title], may submit to the administrator evidence of such existing program and may
request a temporary authorization to carry out such program under this title.
Id. (citations omitted). See id. § 6926(b) for general authorization to the EPA to approve state
programs "in lieu" of the federal program.
112. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 752 F.2d at 1467.
113. Id. at 1467-68.
114. Id.at 1469-72.
115. Id.at 1472.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 36-75.
117. There is no principled distinction between regulation of hazardous waste and regulation of
solid waste.
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immunity from suit."' Second, by allowing the current general federal
Indian law to operate within the RCRA scheme, Washington Department
of Ecology preserves state regulatory power over non-member activity
on lands within the boundaries of the reservation, thereby depriving tribes
of power possessed by other governmental entities: full autonomy to
protect their vital interests." 9
B.

The Proposed RCRA Amendment
The proposed RCRA amendment, House Bill 3735, the principal vehicle
of RCRA reauthorization, adds authority to grant state status to Indian

tribes for enforcement of the Solid Waste Disposal Act. 120 However, it
will do little to strengthen tribal regulatory power. The proposed amendment follows the pattern of earlier "tribes-as-states" authorizations in
the Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act. As an analysis
of the regulatory experience under the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking
Water Act "tribes-as-states" authority shows, changes in the proposed

RCRA amendment are necessary to clarify and strengthen tribal authority
over the management of solid waste, particularly when the solid waste
activity is carried on by non-members.
1. Scope of Proposed Delegation to Tribes
The proposed RCRA "tribes-as-states" provision, like the analogous
Clean Water Act section, defines tribal jurisdiction in broad territorial
terms. Section 904 of House Bill 3735 defines the term "Indian Country"
21
and links the scope of tribal jurisdiction over solid waste to that definition
by limiting
the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe ...

to land and

resources which are held by the Indian tribe, held by the United

118. In doing so, Blue Legs brought tribes into parity with other federal defendants with respect
to solid waste disposal. See 42 U.S.C. § 6964 (1988), which makes solid waste disposal guidelines
applicable to any executive agency and to any unit of the legislative branch which has jurisdiction
over any real property or facility, the administration of which involves the agency in solid waste
management activities. The court concluded that this provision, together with the citizens' suit
provision, constitute a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity. Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of
Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1096-97 (8th Cir. 1989).
119. Some may argue that states ought to retain regulatory authority over non-members to further
health and safety interests. This argument proceeds from the assumption that states have superior
technical and financial resources to manage the environment. While this may be true, the costs of
lost tribal autonomy to national political health are great, and relative tribal technical and financial
weaknesses may be overcome by a combination of federal support to the tribes and contractual
agreements with the states. The concern that solid waste management companies might prefer to
be regulated by weak tribal governments anxious to find employment opportunities for their people
can be met by the requirement that tribal programs, like state programs, must satisfy federal EPA
standards. H.R. 3735, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
120. H.R. 3735, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). See supra note 8 for the text of the proposed
amendment.
121. House Bill 3735 adds a new section 1009 to the RCRA that defines "Indian Country." The
proposed RCRA definition is identical to the definition of "Indian Country" in 18 U.S.C. § 1151
(1988) and has been interpreted to include non-Indian-owned fee land within the boundaries of a
reservation. See supra note 1.
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States in trust for the Indian tribe, held by a member of the Indian
restriction on
tribe if such property interest is subject to a trust
122
alienation, or are otherwise within Indian country.

While the Clean Water Act lacks its own definition of "Indian Country,"
its description of functions to be exercised by the tribe is similar to the
proposed RCRA amendment: those which
pertain to the management and protection of water resources which
are held by an Indian tribe, held by the United States in trust for
Indians, held by a member of an Indian tribe if such property interest
is subject to a trust restriction on 23alienation, or otherwise within the
borders of an Indian reservation.1

On their face, these provisions permit a construction that allows the EPA
to authorize a tribal government to regulate a non-member; however, as
will be shown, the EPA has declined to construe its Clean Water Act
authority so broadly. The Safe Drinking Water Act addresses the scope
of tribal jurisdiction somewhat differently by limiting the functions to

be exercised by the Indian tribe to those "within the area of the Tribal
Government's jurisdiction,"' 24 thus explicitly referring 25the question of
tribal jurisdiction back to general Indian law doctrine.
Whether Congress intended these different formulations of the extent
of the power authorized to be delegated to tribes to express differences
in the scope of tribal regulatory jurisdiction over non-members, if any

at all, is obscure.'

26

Nevertheless, the EPA's implementation of these

122. H.R. 3735, § 1009(b), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (emphasis added).
123. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-l1(b)(l)(B) (1988). For purposes of statutes that lack their own definitions
of "Indian Country,",the definition contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988) usually applies.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-6(c)(1) (1988) shows the circularity of the Safe Drinking Water Act's
treatment of Indian jurisdiction. It provides that "[niothing in the Safe Drinking Water Amendments
of 1977 shall be construed to alter or affect the status of American Indian lands or water rights
nor to waive any sovereignty over Indian lands guaranteed by treaty or statute."
While the Safe Drinking Water Act expressly preserves Indian sovereignty from state intrusions,
its failure to state the scope of that sovereignty makes the backdrop of federal Indian law relevant
to questions of the extent of the state power over non-member activity on Indian lands. The EPA's
response to this legislative gap suggests reluctance to construe the Safe Drinking Water Act to apply
to non-member activity on Indian lands. For example, in the Preamble to the regulations implementing
the Safe Drinking Water Act "tribes-as-states" provision, the EPA declined to indulge in the
presumption that a tribe has jurisdiction over public water supplies serving its members, a presumption
that is supported by the second Montana exception. 53 Fed. Reg. 37,396, 37,399-400 (1988). Instead,
the Agency explained that there are two situations where such a presumption is inappropriate: (1)
where tribal authority has been expressly limited by statute; and (2) where complex ownership
patterns create "checkerboard" areas of federal, state, and tribal ownership, i.e., non-Indian owned
fee lands interspersed with Indian-owned lands. Id. at 37,400.
126. For example, under the Senate version of the Safe Drinking Water Act amendments,
[t]he Administrator is authorized to make special provision for the treatment of
Indian Tribes under this Act, including the treatment of Indian tribes as States to
the degree necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act. Such special provision
may include the direct provision of funds to the governing bodies of Indian tribes,
and the determination of priorities by the Indian tribes, where not determined by
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"tribes-as-states" provisions suggests it perceives differences among them.

In particular, it considers the Clean Water Act to authorize broader
delegations to qualifying tribes than does the Safe Drinking Water Act. 2
a. Safe Drinking Water Act Regulations
The EPA has promulgated regulations setting out requirements for
tribal primacy over the national primary drinking water standards. 28 To
be eligible, a tribe must be one that is recognized by the Secretary of
the Interior and is carrying out police powers within a defined geographic
area. 29 In addition, the EPA requires the tribe to demonstrate that the
functions it seeks to perform in regulating public water systems are within
the tribal government's jurisdiction.' 30 This demonstration can be made
by a tribal attorney or other competent tribal official, who presumably
has to show: (1) that the public water system is tribally-owned or is
owned by a tribal member or enterprise; or (2) that tribal jurisdiction
exists over a water system owned by a non-member by virtue of consent
to regulation, exercise of tribal exclusionary rights, or by a showing that
the relative important interests of the tribe justify its exercise of regulatory
authority.' 3' In other words, instead of helping to delineate the extent
of tribal jurisdiction, the regulations leave the jurisdictional determination
to the EPA based on the same sort of particularized inquiry that has
so muddled general Indian law on the subject.
b. Clean Water Act Regulations
Section 518 of the Clean Water Act 32 authorizes the EPA to delegate
primary authority to tribes for a number of programs 33 and provides

the Administrator in cooperation with the Director of the Indian Health Service.
S. 124, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CoNG. REc. 4300, 4305 (1985).
However, Congress deleted the Senate Bill and substituted a House Bill which contained language
requiring the tribe to show that the functions to be exercised are within the area of the tribal
government's jurisdiction. H.R. 1650, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 4290, 4296, 4305
(1985).
127. This is interesting in light of the principle of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) (when reviewing agency action, federal courts must defer to an agency construction
of its authority absent clear expression of contradictory Congressional intent).
128. 40 C.F.R. § 142.72-.78 (1990). The Safe Drinking Water Act establishes two independent
regulatory schemes to control contaminants in drinking water. The Public Water System Program
establishes water quality standards for water delivered by public water systems. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g
to 300g-6 (1988). The Underground Injection Program regulates injection to protect underground
sources of drinking water. Id. §§ 300h to 300h-7. A state may apply for primary enforcement
responsibility if it can show, inter alia, that it has adopted regulations which are no less stringent
that those established by the EPA. Id. § 300h-l(b)(l)(A). Section 1451 of the 1986 amendments
authorizes the EPA to permit a tribe treated as a state to apply for grant and contract assistance
and for primary enforcement of both the Public Water System and the Underground Injection
programs. Id. § 300j-ll(a).
129. 40 C.F.R. § 142.72 (1990).
130. Id.
131. Id. § 142.76.
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (1988).
133. Indian tribes are to be treated as states to carry out the objectives of certain sections of
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1254 (research, investigation and training); 1256 (grants for

Winter 1990]

INDIAN COUNTRY

for tribal treatment as states with respect to federal financial assistance
for construction of waste-water facilities. Although EPA rulemakings
implementing section 518 are in various stages, the EPA has expressed
its desire for uniform treatment of tribes under Clean Water Act authority.
The EPA's proposal'3 4 for treatment of Indian tribes as states under
section 404135 of the Act illustrates the EPA's approach. Just as under
the Safe Drinking Water Act regulations, a tribe must show that it is
federally-recognized and that it possesses substantial governmental powers
in order to qualify for treatment as a state under the Clean Water Act.
Because the EPA construes the Clean Water Act to grant it greater
discretion to recognize broad tribal jurisdiction, the tribe need only show
that the water resource it seeks to regulate is within the boundaries of
the reservation, a showing that may be made by submission of maps
and tribal ordinances and codes. The EPA has expressed the view that
fewer jurisdictional disputes will arise under the Clean Water Act than
under the Safe Drinking Water Act, at least with respect to the section
404 program, because the EPA interprets the Clean Water Act to allow
reservation
the EPA to recognize tribal authority anywhere within the
13 6
even though that authority operates against non-members.
37
The EPA's view, however, appears to shift in its proposed regulations
pertaining to water quality standards. In its discussion of the proposed
rulemaking, 13 8 the EPA explains that it
[c]an treat an Indian Tribe as a State only where the Tribe already
possesses and can adequately demonstrate authority to manage and
protect water resources within the reservation. The Clean Water Act
proauthorizes use of existing Tribal authority for managing EPA
39
grams, but it does not grant additional authority to Tribes.
Thus, to gain authority over water quality standards, the EPA requires
a tribe to demonstrate its authority by submitting a statement signed by
tribal legal counsel or other tribal official explaining the legal basis for
the tribe's regulatory authority. While maps, codes, and ordinances are
appropriate supplemental documentation, they alone are insufficient to
justify tribal authority.' 4° It appears, then, that the EPA's proposal for
treating tribes as states for water quality standards reverts to the EPA's
position under the Safe Drinking Water Act, with tribal jurisdiction
depending on a multi-faceted factual review. Such a review provides

pollution control); 1313 (water quality standards); 1315 (water quality inventory); 1318 (inspections,
monitoring, and entry); 1319 (federal enforcement); 1324 (clean lakes); 1329 (nonpoint sources);
1341 (certification); 1342 (national pollutant discharge elimination system); and 1344 (dredge and
fill material) (1988).
134. Treatment of Indians as States for Purposes of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 54
Fed. Reg. 49,180 (1989).
135. This section describes the dredge and fill permit system.
136. 54 Fed. Reg. 49,180 (1989).
137. Id. at 39,098.
138. Id.at 39,101.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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opportunities for regulated entities to thwart Congress' will by challenging
either state or tribal jurisdiction under the guise of seeking review of
the EPA's decision to approve or disapprove a state or tribal program.
States may also mount challenges to the EPA's approval of tribal jurisdiction.
One such challenge is South Dakota v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency,' 4' a case of first impression, where South Dakota
seeks to set aside an EPA determination to treat a tribe as a state under
the Safe Drinking Water Act. The EPA granted the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe treatment as a state under the Safe Drinking Water Act regulations
promulgated in 1988.142 South Dakota challenges both the procedural
regularity and the substance of the EPA's decision.
The tribe's application for "treatment as a state" covers public drinking
water systems owned and operated by the tribe itself, as well as systems
owned and operated by municipalities located within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. South Dakota objects to the Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe's initial application for "treatment as a state" because the
state believes that the tribe has failed to show its jurisdiction over the
municipal public drinking water systems. Relying on Montana v. United
States,'4 the EPA found that the tribe established a basis for assertion
of regulatory jurisdiction over all the public drinking water systems within
the exterior boundaries of the reservation because provision of safe
drinking water is important to the tribal health and safety interests.'"
South Dakota challenges the applicability of the second Montana exception and argues that the EPA's determination should be remanded
on the ground, inter alia, that Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of Yakima 14 precludes a finding that the tribe has jurisdiction over
municipalities and municipal officers even though the public water systems
owned by those municipalities supply some water to individual tribal
members.
South Dakota argues that Brendale's plurality opinion makes clear that
the tribe's inherent sovereignty is divested to the extent it involves a
tribe's external relations.' The state also argues that the circumstances
justifying application of the Montana exceptions are absent. Concerning
the exception based on consent, South Dakota asserts that consent to
tribal jurisdiction cannot be based on providing a service to one or more
tribal members. 147 As for the second Montana exception, grounded in a
residuum of tribal sovereignty to govern non-members on fee land when
necessary to protect vital tribal interests, the state argues its effective

141. No. 89-2772 (8th Cir. filed Nov. 8, 1989).
142. 53 Fed. Reg. 37,396 (1988).
143. 450 U.S. 544 (1981); see supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
144. Brief for Respondent at 9, South Dakota, No. 89-2772 (8th Cir. 1989).
145. 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989); see supra text accompanying notes 58-73.
146. Brief for Petitioner at 9, South Dakota, No. 89-2772 (8th Cir. 1989).
147. Cf. Governing Council of Pinoleville Indian Comm'n v. Mendocino County, 684 F. Supp.
1042 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (utility claimed that state regulatory authority was ousted in respect to its
provision of electrical service to a tribal enterprise).
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obliteration by the plurality opinion in Brendale, citing Justice White's
conclusion that "[t]he governing principle is that the tribe has no authority
itself, by way of tribal ordinance or actions in tribal courts, to regulate
the use of fee land."' The state thereby concludes that a tribe necessarily
lacks authority over non-Indian-owned public water systems performing
municipal functions.
South Dakota buttresses its conclusion by turning to the opinion authored by Justice Stevens, contending that Justice Stevens determined
that a tribe may exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee land only
if two requisites are met: first, the area of the reservation must be shown
to be of a "pristine character";149 and second, even in a pristine area,
the tribe must show that tribal interests outweigh state interests 5 ° and
that regulatory jurisdiction is genuinely necessary to protect significant
tribal interests from direct and immediate threats. The state's argument
concludes that no justification exists for exercise of tribal authority over
the municipal water systems involved in this application because the area
is not pristine and because continued state primacy does not present any
threat to tribal interests.
In response, the EPA argues that its reliance on Montana is entirely
proper in light of Brendale5 ' for two reasons: first, the Brendale decision
applied the Montana tests; and second, a majority of the Brendale court,
plurality and dissent, agree that jurisdiction on fee lands is properly
analyzed as a question of a tribe's inherent authority. 5 2 The EPA supports
its contention that the Montana analysis survives Brendale on the ground
that seven justices relied on it and disagreed only on whether authority
to zone fell within those health, safety, and economic interests so vital
to a tribe as to justify tribal jurisdiction.'53 The EPA makes the further
argument that the plurality opinion actually supports a presumption that
tribal authority exists to regulate public water supplies under the Safe
Drinking Water Act. The EPA bases this contention on Justice White's
inclusion of the Safe Drinking Water Act within a list of statutes that,
by delegating federal authority to tribes, may provide a basis for authority
over all lands within a reservation.'5
IV.

PROPOSAL TO CHANGE THE RCRA'S PROPOSED
"TRIBES-AS-STATES" PROVISION

Both the regulatory experience under the Clean Water Act, the Safe
Drinking Water Act, and the South Dakota litigation reveal that current
"tribes-as-states" provisions do little more to settle the scope of tribal

148. Brief for Petitioner at 24-25, South Dakota, No. 89-2772 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting Brendale,
109 S. Ct. at 3008).
149. Id. at 26-27 (citing Brendale, 109 S. Ct. at 3014).
150. See id. at 29.
151. Brief for Respondent at 35, South Dakota, No. 89-2772 (8th Cir. 1989).
152. Id. at 35-37.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 39.
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regulatory jurisdiction than does general federal Indian law, which is
itself in a state of flux. There is no reason to suppose that the proposed
RCRA amendment, so similar to the Clean Water Act provision, will
meet a better fate. For that reason, Congress should refuse to enact the
proposed RCRA amendment as it now stands. To meet the RCRA's goal
of protecting health and environment primarily through decentralized
programmatic control, tribal authority to regulate any solid waste activity
within the boundaries of a reservation, whether carried on by Indian or
non-Indian, whether on fee or non-fee land, should be secured subject
to EPA approval and retention of EPA enforcement power. This may
be achieved by adding language to the definition of Indian Country
explicitly including fee land owned by non-members.
This change is necessary because the present proposed amendment is
insufficient to displace general federal Indian law on regulatory jurisdiction. In turn, this body of law contradicts the Indian policy espoused
by the federal government and undermines the RCRA's purpose of
protecting human health and the environment from hazards stemming
from improper management and disposal of solid waste. Federal Indian
policy provides for treatment of tribal governments on a government to
government basis and supports self-determination and local decisionmaking by Indian tribes."' If the RCRA does not displace general federal
Indian law, then, after Brendale that law may allocate regulatory jurisdiction over a non-member solid waste facility .located within reservation
boundaries to the affected state, not to the tribe, even if the risks of a
mismanaged facility are as great for tribal members and property as they
are for persons and property off the reservation.
To be sure, whether state regulation will ultimately prevail over tribal
management may vary from site to site because general federal Indian
law now holds that the jurisdictional outcome hinges on either a particularized inquiry into the relative state and tribal interests or on a factdependent inquiry focusing on tribal efforts to exclude non-members from
the region. The fact that allocation of regulatory authority is indeterminate
itself undermines the aims of the RCRA insofar as uncertainty encourages
resistance to state regulation on the part of both the tribe and the solid
waste company located within the boundaries of Indian lands: a tribe is
likely to resist state jurisdiction to advance its sovereignty claims; a solid
waste company is likely to resist assertions of both state and tribal
authority because of claimed uncertainty about which sovereign is the
appropriate regulator and to save costs of compliance by delaying enforcement of standards promulgated to protect health and safety.
To foster the purposes of the RCRA and to facilitate federal Indian
policy, the RCRA must be amended so that tribes become full partners
in the regulation of solid waste. Full partnership calls for federal assistance
at two different levels. First, the tribes must be furnished the resources,

155. President's Statement on Indian Policy, 1983 PuB. PAPERS 96 (Jan. 24, 1983); 1984 EPA
Poucy, supra note 33.
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both technical and financial, to carry out the federally-mandated health
and environmental purposes of the RCRA. Second, tribes must receive
explicit federal recognition that their sovereign powers include the power
to regulate the activities of non-members within the boundaries of the
reservation. Only such a broad delegation of programmatic responsibility
will displace the uncertainty of current general federal Indian law that
invites litigation and delayed compliance. Unequivocal federal recognition
of tribal regulatory authority to regulate solid wastes, coupled with a
federal infusion of resources enabling the tribes to carry out their responsibilities, offers another potential benefit as well. Placing tribes on
an equal footing with states may reduce the competitive hostility that
now governs so many state and tribal relations, thereby encouraging
agreements for sharing their regulatory resources so as to maximize their
51 6
combined strength in the service of environmental and health protection.
The concern that weak tribal governments will underregulate nonmember solid waste facilities is met by the requirement that the EPA
must approve tribal programs to ensure that they are as stringent as the
federal requirements and by the retention of federal enforcement power
in the EPA. This arrangement, of course, simply parallels the federalstate relationship now in force under the RCRA.
V. CONCLUSION
The RCRA's silence respecting tribal authority to regulate solid wastes
leaves a gap which general federal Indian law fills. That law currently
tends in the direction of weak tribal regulatory authority, especially over
non-member activity on fee land within the boundaries of an Indian
reservation. Because that land may become increasingly attractive for use
as waste disposal sites by solid waste management enterprises, growing
health and environmental threats to Indian people and resources are
likely.
By proposing to authorize tribes to act as states in the RCRA amendments, Congress evinces an intention to extend decentralized programmatic
control over solid wastes to tribes, presumably because local control better
serves the RCRA's environmental goals than does the EPA's more removed management. However, an examination of similar provisions in
the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act shows that the proposed
amendment is insufficiently explicit to displace current federal Indian
law. In reconsidering the RCRA, Congress should expressly recognize
tribal authority to regulate non-members. Assuming the retention of both
the requirement that tribal programs must be at least as stringent as the
federal program and federal financial and technical support of tribal
efforts to regulate solid waste, this recognition will advance efforts to
protect all people and the environment.

156. That Congress favors cooperative agreements between tribes and states in solid waste management is manifested by a provision in the proposed RCRA which expressly encourages them.
H.R. 3735, § 1009(c), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).

